

# Land Reform and Productivity: Evidence from the Dissolution of the French Monasteries\*

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## Abstract

This article uses the confiscation and auction of monastic properties during the French Revolution to assess the effects of land reallocation on agricultural productivity. To proxy for monastic landholdings, I construct a novel dataset using the annual income and location of more than 1,500 French monasteries in 1768. I perform several cross-checking analyses and demonstrate the validity of the data as a proxy for monastic landholdings both at the monastery and *arrondissement* levels. I show that *arrondissements* with greater land reallocation experienced higher levels of agricultural productivity in the mid-19th century. I trace these increases in productivity to the creation of larger and less fragmented farms, leading to an increase in mechanization and the substitution of family labor with a hired specialized labor force.

**Keywords:** Land Reform, Productivity, French Revolution, Monasteries, Farm Size

**JEL Codes:** O13, O40, Q15, N53

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*[...] the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Germain [...] is the richest abbey in France; the abbot has 300,000 livres a year (£13,125). I lose my patience at such revenues being thus bestowed; consistent with the spirit of the tenth century, but not with that of the eighteenth. What a noble farm would the fourth of this income establish! What turnips, what cabbages, what potatoes, what clover, what sheep, what wool! Are not these things better than a fat ecclesiastic? If an active English farmer was mounted behind this abbot, I think he would do more good to France with half the income than half the abbots of the kingdom with the whole of theirs.*

Arthur Young (1792), Travels in France During the Years 1787, 1788 & 1789.

## 1 Introduction

Growth in agricultural productivity has long been viewed as a necessary step for economic development and structural change (Lewis, 1955; Rostow, 1990; Gollin et al., 2002). Yet, despite the availability of modern and mechanized inputs, agricultural productivity remains remarkably low in most developing countries. A growing body of literature identifies the misallocation of productive resources as one of the key elements explaining the agricultural productivity gap.<sup>1</sup> In particular, the preponderance of (very) small family-operated farms is recognized as a critical symptom of land and labor misallocation in developing countries.

The importance of the misallocation problem for agricultural productivity is well established in today's developing economies, but there is scant empirical evidence of its historical importance. In particular, there is still little evidence of the policies and reforms that have enabled today's developed countries to mitigate the effects of misallocation. For instance, Polanyi (2001, p. 325) identifies the "commercialization of the soil" as a crucial step to achieving efficient allocation of the land. In particular, he highlights that the "secularization of church lands was [...] one of the chief means of the ordered transference of land into the hands of private

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<sup>1</sup>See Restuccia and Rogerson (2013, 2017) for a review of the literature on production factors misallocation.

individuals”.

In this article, I investigate a historical case of market-based land reallocation and its effect on agricultural productivity and farm size. I study the confiscation and auction of Church land, known as the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* (the Sale of National Properties), ordered by the French Constituent Assembly in the 1790s. As a result of the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*, 6% of French land and more than 170,000 buildings were reallocated by auction from the Church to secular owners in the course of five years. According to [Lecarpentier \(1908\)](#), author’s translation p. 4), this was “the most important event of the Revolution”.

I focus, in particular, on the reallocation of *monastic* land, which represented a substantial part of Church land ([Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000](#)). Extensive historical evidence suggests that the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* allowed rich farmers and bourgeois to create larger farms by merging their landholdings with land confiscated from the Church and monasteries. This typically favored the emergence of capitalist farmers with large and mechanized production techniques. In contrast, places with less monastic land were trapped in pre-revolutionary landholding patterns, as they were either not affected, or only marginally affected, by the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*.

To conduct the empirical analysis, I assembled a rich dataset from historical archives and secondary sources at the *arrondissement* level.<sup>2</sup> My main measure of the extent of monastic land reallocation in a given *arrondissement* is its initial exposure to monastic income in 1768. This measure captures the importance of monastic lands before the Revolution at the local level and, consequently, the extent of land reallocation through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*. To calculate monastic income exposure, I collected data on the annual income and location of more than 1,500 French monasteries before the Revolution. To further validate this measure, I perform two cross-checking exercises. First, using additional monastery-level historical data, I show that the best predictor of monastic income at the monastery level is hectares of agricultural

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<sup>2</sup>An *arrondissement* is the first-level subdivision of French *départements* (NUTS3 units).

land. Other types of properties, such as mills, houses or barns have little or no predictive power in relation to monastic income. Second, using additional historical data at the *arrondissement* level, I show that most of the variation in the percentage of Church land confiscated and sold at auction in 1789 is explained by monastic income exposure, and this is not confounded by other factors.

I find that those areas with higher levels of monastic land reallocation had higher levels of agricultural productivity in the first-half of the 19th century. Regarding magnitudes, my preferred specification indicates that a doubling in monastic income exposure in 1768 led to an 11% increase in wheat yields in 1852.

One potential source of concern in interpreting the above findings is that the initial distribution of monastic income exposure might be correlated with other factors affecting agricultural productivity in the 19th century. I employ several strategies to alleviate this concern. First, my analysis accounts for a large set of confounding characteristics, such as agricultural suitability, topography and pre-Revolution development levels. I also show the robustness of my main results to other potential confounders including market potential, the confiscation of land owned by *émigrés*, upper-tail human capital, literacy and religiosity. Further, my preferred specifications include region fixed effects, thus exploiting the within-region variation in monastic income exposure.<sup>3</sup> Finally, I provide pre-trends evidence, showing that *arrondissements* with higher monastic income exposure did not grow faster than their counterparts in the years before the French Revolution.

What explains the positive relationship between monastic land reallocation and agricultural productivity in the mid-19th century? Following the recent literature on farm size and misallocation in developing countries and historical evidence of land fragmentation in pre-Revolutionary France, I first investigate the effect of the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* on farm size and land fragmentation. Using *département* and *arrondissement*-level information from the

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<sup>3</sup>The regions are the French NUTS1 entities.

*Enquête Agricole* of 1852, 1862 and [Legoyt \(1843\)](#), I show that areas with higher levels of land reallocation had larger and less fragmented farms in the mid-19th century.

Next, I investigate two potential mechanisms linking farm size and agricultural productivity: (i) mechanization and (ii) labor organization. First, mechanization diffused slowly through France in the first-half of the 19th century. A key reason for this slow pace was the substantial cost of modern physical capital that only large landowners were able to finance. By favoring land concentration at the right tail of the farm size distribution, the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* triggered an increase in land inequality. According to [Galor and Zeira \(1993\)](#) and [Galor and Moav \(2004\)](#), inequality supports economic development when the prime engine of growth is physical capital accumulation, as it was presumably the case in mid-19th century France. Using data from the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852, I show that land reallocation at the time of the Revolution was positively associated with investment in agricultural machines, as measured by the number of scarifiers and extirpators in 1852.

Second, I investigate the gradual change in the composition of the agricultural labor force along with farm size. Large farms typically substitute family labor force by hiring a specialized male labor force. Using data from the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852, I find that land reallocation was negatively associated with the share of labor by women and children required to farm one hectare of wheat, suggesting a greater use of a male (specialized) labor force.

This article contributes to the literature on the productivity effects of land reforms. Existing studies show mixed results, depending on the type of land reform considered. On the one hand, land-ceiling reforms are found to have a negative effect on agricultural productivity in India ([Ghatak and Roy, 2007](#)) and the Philippines ([Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2020](#)), for example. On the other hand, market-assisted land reforms are found to increase agricultural productivity in Malawi ([Mendola and Simtowe, 2015](#)), for example. I contribute to this literature in two main respects. First, I contribute directly to the scant literature studying the productivity effects of land reform in a historical context. Second, I offer an additional case study of successful

market-assisted land reform.

The most closely related study is that by [Finley et al. \(2021\)](#), which uses Church land confiscations of the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* to assess the role played by transaction costs in delaying the reallocation of property rights. The authors find a positive effect on agricultural productivity that dissipated over the course of the 19th century. While I share the focus on the same historical episode and some underlying mechanisms, my research stands out with its several original contributions. First, I focus on a specific Church related entity, monasteries, that account for most Church-held land before the Revolution ([Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000](#)). Second, I build on the data ground, providing a new dataset enabling to proxy the land reallocation triggered by the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* for the entire French territory at the *arrondissement* level.<sup>4</sup> [Finley et al. \(2021\)](#) use data from [Bodinier and Teyssier \(2000\)](#) covering only about 40% of the French *arrondissements*. Finally, I explore additional complementary mechanisms such as land consolidation and labor organization.

This article also contributes to the literature on the relationship between inequality, investments and economic development. [Galor and Zeira \(1993\)](#) and [Galor and Moav \(2004\)](#) argue for the non-monotonic role of equality in the process of development. When growth is driven by physical capital accumulation, equality is detrimental to economic development, diverting resources from individuals with a high propensity to save. On the contrary, when growth is driven by human capital accumulation, equality promotes economic development. Most of the literature has focused on the detrimental effect of land inequality on human capital provision and its consequences in the context of the Second Industrial Revolution ([Galor et al., 2009](#); [Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016](#); [Goñi, 2022](#)). By contrast, I provide evidence of the positive effect of land inequality for economic development in the context of the First Industrial Revolution, namely when basic education of the labor force was not yet a condition for economic

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<sup>4</sup>This is also notable because the majority of studies looking at the determinants of French comparative development in the 19th century are conducted at the *département* level (one NUTS level above the *arrondissement*). For instance, [Diebolt et al. \(2017\)](#), [de la Croix and Perrin \(2018\)](#) and [Franck and Galor \(2021\)](#) study the interactions between education, fertility and long-run development at the *département* level.

growth ([Galor and Moav, 2006](#)).<sup>5</sup> Consistent with this view, I provide evidence that, up to the first half of the 19th century, the reallocation of monastic lands triggered both an increase in land ownership inequality and an increase in physical capital and agricultural productivity.

Finally, this article also relates to a broader literature analyzing the economic consequences of the secularization of society through the dissolution of Church related entities such as monasteries. In particular, my study is closely related to [Heldring et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Cantoni et al. \(2018\)](#), who analyze the economic consequences of the 16th-century dissolution of English and German monasteries, respectively. In both cases, the authors argue that the dissolution of monasteries triggered an efficient reallocation of resources from religious to secular purposes, thereby promoting economic development. I contribute to this literature by exploring the economic consequences of the dissolution of the monasteries in the French case. Although in a different context and epoch, I reach similar conclusions to those in [Heldring et al. \(2021\)](#) and [Cantoni et al. \(2018\)](#), showing that the dissolution of French monasteries and the privatization of their lands promoted economic development.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide the necessary historical background, including an overview of the changes observed in French agricultural productivity and landholding patterns before and after the French Revolution. In Section 3, I introduce my measure of monastic landholdings, explain my empirical strategy, and discuss the main threats regarding identification. I present and discuss my main results on the effect of land reallocation on agricultural productivity in Section 4. In Section 5, I explore the mechanisms driving my results, and in Section 6, I conclude.

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<sup>5</sup>Related to that literature and my focus on French agricultural productivity, [Bignon and García-Peñalosa \(2021\)](#) show that a tariff on cereals (the *Méline* tariff of 1892) reduced primary school enrollment and increased fertility, thus slowing French economic development and industrialization in the second-half of the 19th century.

## 2 Historical Background

In this section, I provide some historical background on French agriculture, monastic landholdings and the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*. I begin by discussing the evolution of French agricultural productivity and landholding patterns before and after the Revolution. Then, I discuss the importance of monastic land before the Revolution and the changes prompted by the *Vente des Biens nationaux* in terms of farm size.

### 2.1 Agricultural Productivity and Landholding Patterns Before and After the French Revolution

Evidence indicates that French agricultural productivity began to rise consistently during the first half of the 19th century. [Newell \(1973\)](#), analyzing the historical series compiled by [Toutain \(1961\)](#), shows that the French agricultural output per worker started to rise in the 1820s. By contrast, the pre-revolutionary and the Napoleonic periods were characterized by stagnation in agricultural productivity ([Newell, 1973](#); [Allen, 2000](#); [Hoffman, 2000](#)).<sup>6</sup> The overall rise in agricultural productivity was rapid. [Bairoch \(1988\)](#) estimates its average annual growth of 1.1% between 1830 and 1880. This is higher than the rate of growth in the United Kingdom (0.7%) and the European average (0.6%) over the same period. The strong rise in agricultural productivity was seen across all French *départements* and all major crop types however, there were remarkable differences across regions ([Newell, 1973](#)). For instance, between 1800 and 1862, labor productivity in wheat production, as measured by man-days per hectolitre, increased 10pp faster in the north of France than in Brittany ([Grantham, 1993](#)).

Historians have put forward two main hypotheses to explain the rise of French agricultural productivity during the first half of the 19th century: (i) technical innovations and (ii) organizational changes. In respect of the first, this period is marked by several important agricultural

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<sup>6</sup>[Hoffman \(2000\)](#) finds very low growth in total factor productivity in agriculture before the Revolution, of the order of 0.1% per year at most.



innovations that diffused gradually within France. More efficient crop rotation systems replaced the three-field or two-field rotation systems established in the Middle-Ages.<sup>7</sup> More powerful fertilizers were also available, such as Peruvian guano and, from the 1840s on, artificial fertilizers. Finally, this period was also marked by the gradual adoption of the first agricultural machines, for example, threshers and harvesters.

Despite the importance of these innovations for agricultural work, it should be noted that their slow diffusion meant that their actual impact likely remained limited for a long time in some parts of the French territory. Their cost, as well as reluctance to change (because of “traditional mentalities”), seem to have presented significant obstacles to the adoption of such innovations for a large share of agricultural exploitations. [Sée \(1927\)](#) estimates that modern agricultural production techniques had only achieved total dissemination over the whole French territory by the second half of the 19th century.

The low investment in available new technologies and productivity differences within France after the Revolution can also be explained by landholding patterns. Pre-Revolution France was characterized by the dominance of small landowners. Peasants, while representing 90% of the landowners, owned only about 40% of the French land before the Revolution ([Sée, 1925](#)). [Hoffman \(2000\)](#) notes that in the village of Goincourt, north of Paris, only 3% of the farmers owned more than 10 hectares in 1717; 96% owned less than 2 hectares. Similar patterns are evident for 18th century Normandy and in the South of France. A pattern confirmed also in the North of France, a heavily agricultural region, where 60-70% of peasants possessed less than one hectare ([Lefebvre, 1972](#), p.37).<sup>8</sup>

It was not simply that landowners had few hectares available to farm. What also kept agricultural productivity low before the Revolution was the fragmentation of landholdings. For

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<sup>7</sup>In particular, these new systems replace the unproductive land in fallow by artificial prairies (*prairies artificielles*) of forage crops such as clover, alfalfa or sainfoin. This has the double advantage of fixing nitrogen in the soil while providing forage for farm animals, allowing for better fertilization of the soil with manure.

<sup>8</sup>[Vigneron \(2008\)](#) gives similar figures for the Cambrésis and Lille province with properties of less than one hectares representing more than 50% of the landholdings in 1751.

a farmer, owning 10 hectares of land did not mean that those 10 hectares were concentrated in a continuous stretch of land. Rather, the average farmer was likely to own several parcels of few hectares each, physically separated and distant from each another. Figure 1 illustrates the pre-Revolution land fragmentation by showing the agricultural plots in the village of Athis-Mons in the Essonne *département* in 1750 (Moriceau, 2002). Each color indicates a different owner, revealing sizeable land fragmentation.

The influence of small landowners on French agriculture remained strong after the French Revolution. The first comprehensive data on landholdings after the Revolution shows that in 1862 half of all agricultural exploitations were under 5 hectares. However, it is also worth noting that there was substantial variations in landholding patterns across *départements*, notably at the top of the distribution; the same source indicates that, in the mid-19th century, 25% of the farms were above 10 hectares, which is usually considered the threshold to be a large agricultural exploitation.

Large and consolidated farms were key to raising agricultural productivity for several reasons. There are several reasons for this. First, an increase in farm size led to a gradual change in the composition of the agricultural labor force, from family labor toward the hiring of specialized laborers. Indeed, small agricultural exploitations traditionally relied on labor supply from the family (the head of the family, as well as wife and children).<sup>9</sup> Task specialization was limited, with all members of the family performing the various farm tasks required (plowing, sowing and harvesting).

Large farms were able to employ specialists and day laborers (*journaliers*), each dedicated to specific tasks: this specialization enabled larger farms to employ fewer workers per hectare, thus increasing labor productivity. Allen (1988) shows that the change in labor-force composition and the size of farms explains the rise in labor productivity for 18th-century English agriculture. In a modern context, Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014) also find substantial labor

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<sup>9</sup>Nuclear family members were the most common source of labor on small farms. Labor from extended family was also present, but could rarely provide sufficient labor for large farms (Hoffman, 2000, p.48).

Figure 15. Une vision d'historien :  
le parcellaire d'Athis, Mons et Paray au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle

Sources : Arch. nat. N I Seine-et-Loire 31, 32, 45 ;  
ibid., N II Seine-et-Oise 36 et 158 ; Arch. com. Athis-Mons, plan de 1750

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productivity differences by farm size using the 2007 US Census of Agriculture. In particular, they find that value added per worker is more than doubled when moving from the smallest farms (0.5-5 hectares) to what, in the present case, would be considered a large farm (30-40 hectares).<sup>10</sup>

Large farms are also more productive because of increasing returns to mechanization with increased farm size, allowing large agricultural exploitations further savings on labor costs and increased labor productivity. As pointed by [Foster and Rosenzweig \(2011, 2022\)](#), in the context of India in the 2010s, large machines cannot be used at their full capacity on small farms or plots. In the present case, the relationship between farm size and mechanization is supported by the historical study of [Hoffman \(2000, p.36\)](#), who finds that before the Revolution, farms under 5 hectares did not invest in basic capital, such as plows and horses.<sup>11</sup>

## 2.2 Monastic Land, the Vente des Biens Nationaux and Farm Size

Before the Revolution, monasteries (and the Church more generally) were among the largest landowners in France. Historians estimate that they possessed as much as 5-6% of the French land while representing only 1.8% of the adult male population in 1789 ([Lecarpentier, 1908](#); [Sée, 1925](#)). Church and monastic lands were unevenly distributed over the French territory. The detailed analysis by [Bodinier and Teyssier \(2000\)](#) of over 40% of French districts shows that in 1789, 4.4% of the territory of the median district was owned by monasteries and the Church.<sup>12</sup> The top (bottom) quartile was composed of districts with more (less) than 8% (1.9%) of their land held by monasteries and the Church, with the maximum being reached in the district of Cambrai (40.1%) and the minimum in the district of Tartas (0.3%).

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<sup>10</sup>This pattern holds also in various developing countries ([Cornia, 1985](#)).

<sup>11</sup>[Hoffman \(2000, p.286\)](#) cites numerous studies showing that the median farm size to own a plow was 10 hectares.

<sup>12</sup>Districts were the initial first-level subdivision of the French departments created after the Revolution. They were replaced by the *arrondissements* in 1800. Districts were more numerous than *arrondissements* (534 districts in 1790 for 364 *arrondissements* circa 1850). They were therefore smaller on average.



Monasteries received large parcels of agricultural land from patrons during the Middle Ages and were a key component of the Church's landholdings. Bodinier and Teyssier (2000, p.339) show that, at the time of the Revolution, monasteries held around 60% of Church land. In fact, the presence of a single powerful monastery in one district could account for as much as 20 to 30 % of Church land in that district, with some notable exceptions reaching even higher figures. This was the case for the famous abbey of Cluny (46%), Saint-Sever (32.2%), Jumièges (23.7%) or Fontevraud (21.2%) (Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000, p. 341). Despite the significance of these figures, Bodinier and Teyssier (2000) recognize that they are undoubtedly underestimated as powerful monasteries typically held additional land outside of their district of origin. For example, the Parisian abbey of Saint-Germain-des-Prés owned land across the Ile-de-France region and even in Normandy, that is to say, far beyond its original constituency (Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000, p. 343).

The French Revolution brought the Church's dominance in landholding to an abrupt end. On November 2, 1789, a law was passed to confiscate and auction all Church properties, including monastic properties. This decision, largely unexpected by the public, came as a means to pay off the debts accumulated by the monarchy.<sup>13</sup> This historical event, known as the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* (the Sale of National Properties), saw 6% of French land and more than 170,000 buildings reallocated from the Church to secular owners auction; more than 700,000 Church properties were sold. According to Lecarpentier (1908, author's translation p. 4), this was "the most important event of the Revolution".

The *Vente des Biens Nationaux* triggered a vast reallocation of land, enabling rich farmers and bourgeois to create large agricultural exploitations by merging their lands with those confiscated from the Church and monasteries. As underlined by Tocqueville (1967, author's translation p. 89), most of the lands "were purchased by people who already owned other lands; so that,

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<sup>13</sup>The *Vente des Biens Nationaux* is closely linked to the creation of bonds backed on the confiscated property, called *assignats*. In 1791, these bonds became a fiat currency, before collapsing due to hyperinflation. The *assignat* was finally abolished in 1797.

if the property changed hands, the number of owners increased much less than one might imagine.”<sup>14</sup> This view has been confirmed by the detailed historical analysis of Bodinier and Teyssier (2000). In most of the districts, a small number of rich farmers and bourgeois acquired most of the land. For example, in the district of Bernay, 27 members of the grand bourgeoisie succeeded in buying 39% of the Church land while representing only 4% of the buyers. Small-scale peasants farmers, on the other hand, were unable to acquire a significant amount of land through the auction process because of their limited capacity to bid against wealthier bourgeois and large farmers.<sup>15</sup>

The *Vente des Biens Nationaux* thus also represented an increase in land inequality. This effect is clearly seen in the evolution of farm-size distribution in the Artois region before and after the Revolution (Jessenne, 1987); the case study shows that the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* corresponded to an increase in the right-tail of the farm size distribution (Figure A-1 in Appendix). Notably, small agricultural exploitations (between 5 and 9 hectares) completely disappear.<sup>16</sup>

The implications of monastic land reallocation through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* for farm size and the concentration of landholdings are illustrated in Figure 2, the parcels held by Alexandre Le Bourlier d’Orgeval, the largest landowner in Athis-Mons, before and after the French Revolution. His pre-Revolution landholdings are represented in blue and green, and the land acquired through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* is represented in red. As the map reveals, the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* enabled this pre-Revolution landowner to increase his already considerable estate by acquiring almost 50 hectares from the Cistercian abbey of Vaux-de-Cernay.<sup>17</sup> This represented a of 30% increase and consolidation of his pre-Revolution

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<sup>14</sup>This view is also defended notably by Lecarpentier (1908), Marion (1908) and Jaurès (1924).

<sup>15</sup>Another reason was the fact that buyers had to travel to the district or *département* administrative capital to bid. This further limited the capacity of small landowners to acquire land as they faced a relatively high transportation cost Bodinier and Teyssier (2000, p.228).

<sup>16</sup>Unfortunately, this study does not provide the evolution of the smallest agricultural exploitations – i.e. below 5 hectares. However, as explained in this section, there is a good chance that very small farms remained unchanged after the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* because: (i) they were not confiscated and (ii) poor landowners were not able to acquire land through the auctions.

<sup>17</sup>The abbey of Vaux-de-Cernay is located 34 kilometers away from Athis-Mons.

Figure 2: Land Consolidation and the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* in the village of Athis-Mons



Notes: This figure shows the changes in Alexandre Le Bourlier d'Orgeval's parcels before and after the French Revolution (Moriceau, 2002). In particular, his pre-Revolution landholdings are represented in blue and green, while his land acquisition through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* is represented in red.

agricultural domain.

### 3 Data and Empirical Framework

In my empirical analysis, I combine various datasets at the *arrondissement* level. An *arrondissement* is the first-level subdivision of French *départements*.<sup>18</sup> The *arrondissements* were created in 1800 and replaced the *districts* initially created after the Revolution. Importantly, the number and boundaries of the *arrondissements* were stable during the 19th century. There were 364 *arrondissements* at the time of our analysis (circa 1850), of which 354 are in our main sample.<sup>19</sup> The average size of an *arrondissement* in our study was 1,435 square kilometers, with a standard deviation of 573.

I begin by presenting my main explanatory variable – i.e. monastic income exposure – as a proxy for monastic land reallocation at the *arrondissement* level. Then, I present my main estimating equation and discuss the potential threats to my identification strategy.

#### 3.1 Monastic Income Exposure and Monastic Lands

My main explanatory variable is monastic income exposure in 1768 at the *arrondissement* level. I use it as a proxy for the importance of monastic landholdings in a given *arrondissement* at the time of the Revolution. Ideally, I would like to have information on the size and location of each parcel belonging to a monastery in France at the time of the Revolution to study the effect of land reallocation. Unfortunately, such data is scarce and only available for certain monasteries. Monastic income exposure combines data on the annual income and location of French monasteries in 1768 from three sources: the *France Ecclésiastique*, the *Almanach Royal* and [Lecestre \(1902\)](#); see Appendix C for a complete discussion and details about monastic income data. Monastic income exposure is defined as follows:

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<sup>18</sup>The *départements* correspond to the NUTS3 units.

<sup>19</sup>The 10 missing *arrondissements* are due either to missing data from the monastic income side (the 6 Corsican *arrondissements*) or from the *Enquête Agricole* side (Bourganeuf, Béziers, Grasse and Paris).



$$Monastic\ Income\ Exposure_a = \sum_m \frac{1/d_{a,m}}{\sum_a 1/d_{a,m}} \cdot I_m, \quad (1)$$

with  $d_{a,m}$  the kilometric distance between the centroid of *arrondissement*  $a$  and the location of monastery  $m$ , and  $I_m$  the annual income of monastery  $m$ . In this form, the monastic income exposure of *arrondissement*  $a$  is a weighted average of all monastic incomes, with weights corresponding to relative inverse distance.<sup>20</sup>

My measure of monastic income exposure exploits two facts about monastic landholding patterns to proxy the extent of land owned by monasteries in each *arrondissement*. First, the probability of an *arrondissement* hosting the land of a given monastery decreases with distance. Historians have pointed to the decreasing concentration of monastic properties as one moves away from the cloister (Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000; Goudot, 2006; Wilkin, 2011).<sup>21</sup> This is captured in (1) as monastic income exposure of a given *arrondissement* decreases with an increase in distance to a monastery ( $\partial MIE_a / \partial d_{a,m} < 0$ ). Most monasteries have been founded and endowed by the local nobility, meaning that most of the monastery's land was located in neighbouring *arrondissements*.<sup>22</sup> Second, the amount of land owned by a monastery in an *arrondissement* increases with monastic income. This is because monasteries were powerful landowners and consequently derived a substantial part of their income from agriculture (see Section 2.2). This is also captured in (1) as the monastic income exposure of a given *arrondissement* increases with respect to monastic income ( $\partial MIE_a / \partial I_m > 0$ ).

To validate my proxy of monastic landholdings, I perform two empirical exercises using additional historical data, one at the monastery level and one at the *arrondissement* level. In the

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<sup>20</sup>This ensures that each monastery's income is distributed at 100% across *arrondissements*. In spirit, this is close to computing a spatially lagged variable with inverse distance and row-standardized weights, an approach widely used in the spatial econometrics literature (Anselin, 2001).

<sup>21</sup>The cloister is the main monastic building where the monks live.

<sup>22</sup>Nevertheless, famous monasteries were receiving donations coming from hundreds of kilometres away. For example, the abbey of Marmoutier, one of the oldest and most famous Benedictine abbeys, had about 200 priories in the 17th century that were located in 29 different *départements* (Carré de Busserolle, 1882, p. 181-191). Five priories of the abbey of Marmoutier were even located in England.

first cross-checking exercise, I explicitly test the link between monastic income and the amount of land owned by monasteries in 1789 at the monastery level. To do so, I use data compiled by Bodinier (1988) on the number, size and type of properties owned by French monasteries in the Eure or Seine-Maritime *département* (NUTS3 level) on the eve of the Revolution.<sup>23</sup> From this dataset, I can, therefore, compute the number of hectares of agricultural land, woods, vineyards or wasteland owned by 45 monasteries located in the two *départements* along with information on other economic assets such as mills, houses, markets, justice courts, and chapels.

Table D-1 in the Appendix examines the relationship between monastic income in 1768 and hectares of agricultural land owned by monasteries in 1789. Across all specifications, hectares of agricultural land appears to be a strong and robust predictor of monastic income. Specifically, hectares of agricultural land held explains half of the variations in monastic income in the bivariate regression. On the contrary, other types of properties, such as mills, houses or barns, have little or no predictive power in respect of monastic income. This relationship holds also when considering the number of farms rather than hectares of agricultural land owned by monasteries in 1789 (Table D-2).

The second cross-checking exercise is a direct test of the ability of monastic income exposure to capture monastic landholdings at the *arrondissement* level. For that exercise, I use data collected by Bodinier and Teyssier (2000) on the percentage of Church land redistributed in French districts through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*. These data are available for only 40% of the French *arrondissements* referenced in my main analysis. As established in Section 2.2, monasteries were large landowners, accounting, on average, for 60% of Church land in the various districts (Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000). Consequently, I expect a large and positive relationship between the two variables.

I proceed in two steps. First, I use bivariate regressions of the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 on monastic income exposure with different distance cutoffs to calibrate

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<sup>23</sup>I warmly thank Bernard Bodinier for having shared his data with me. The data come from his doctoral thesis and his personal notes for the Seine-Maritime *département*.

my inverse distance weights in (1). As shown in Appendix Table D-3, the fit between the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 and monastic income exposure is maximized for a distance cutoff of 100km.<sup>24</sup> Specifically, monastic income exposure explains half of the variation in the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 (column 5). Figure 3 depicts that strong bivariate relationship. By contrast, the worst fit is found in column 1 where monastic income exposure is defined as the sum of monastic income at the *arrondissement* level ( $MIE_a = \sum_{m \in a} I_m$ ) – that is, ignoring spatial spillovers. In that case, monastic income exposure explains only 16% of the variation in the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789.

Figure 4 shows monastic income exposure for each *arrondissements* by decile. My proxy of monastic landholdings is consistent with Bodinier and Teyssier (2000, p.335), who note that Church properties were concentrated in the North-Eastern France (Brittany excluded) and, in particular, above a line from Nantes to Belfort. Significant variations within each region are accurately depicted.


Second, I verify the ability of monastic income exposure to explain the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 in the presence of confounding variables. For instance, *arrondissements* with fertile land for agriculture could have given more land to the Church and hosted richer monasteries. This is an endogeneity issue that I address in more details in the next section.

As set out in Table D-4 in the Appendix, monastic income exposure remains the best predictor of the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 across all the specifications. In particular, the correlation between monastic income exposure and the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 stays positive and highly significant, controlling for the agricultural potential of the land, ruggedness, urbanization, distance to bishoprics, and region fixed effects. Figure A-2 shows that the relationship identified in column 6 is not influenced by outliers.

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<sup>24</sup>In the rest of the paper, I will use the term monastic income exposure to designate monastic income exposure computed with (1) and a 100km cutoff.

Figure 3: Correlation between the percentage of Church Land Redistributed during the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* and Monastic Income Exposure



Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the percentage of Church land reallocated through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* and log monastic income exposure in 1768. Residuals and coefficient estimates from Table D-3, column 5.


### 3.2 Estimation Framework

My main specification estimates the cross-sectional relationship between monastic land reallocation triggered by the French Revolution and agricultural productivity in the mid-19th century.

I estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) specification:

$$Y_{a,1850} = \beta \cdot \text{Monastic Income Exposure}_{a,1768} + \gamma' \mathbf{X}_a + \alpha_r + \varepsilon_a, \quad (2)$$

Figure 4: Spatial Distribution of Monastic Income Exposure



*Notes:* This figure plots monastic income exposure in 1768 by decile. See text for more informations on the construction of monastic income exposure.

where  $a = 1, \dots, N$  represents an *arrondissement*, and the dependent variable,  $Y$ , represents agricultural productivity, typically measured circa 1850. The right-hand side is composed of our variable of interest – monastic income exposure in year 1768 – proxying Revolution-era land reallocation, a vector of control variables  $\mathbf{X}_{a,t}$ , region fixed effects  $\alpha_r$ , and an idiosyncratic error term  $\varepsilon_a$ . Throughout my analysis, I report robust standard errors for regression coefficients, clustered at the *département* level. I address potential spatial correlation issues by systematically reporting [Conley \(1999\)](#) standard errors. In particular, I use a bandwidth of 100km together with a Bartlett kernel. Typically, I find that Conley standard errors do not differ significantly

from the standard errors clustered at the *département* level.

The main concern is the potential endogeneity of monastic income exposure; that is, rich monasteries may be located in places that were inherently more favorable to economic development. For instance, *arrondissements* with land that is suited for agriculture could be more productive and host richer monasteries. My main strategy to deal with this issue is to use several relevant control variables to capture development differences prior to 1789. First, I explicitly take account of differences between *arrondissement* in the initial suitability of their land for agriculture using the Caloric Suitability Index of [Galor and Özak \(2016\)](#).

I then control for the ruggedness of the terrain using elevation data from CGIAR-CSI SRTM ([Jarvis et al., 2008](#)). Terrain ruggedness captures a broad range of factors affecting economic development, for example, transportation and trade. Importantly for my analysis, irregular terrain is difficult to farm, making land fragmentation more likely and directly impacting agricultural productivity. Third, I control for pre-revolutionary differences in economic development using urban population levels in 1750 from [Buringh \(2021\)](#). Fourth, in my preferred specification I include 21 region fixed effects, identifying the effect of land reallocation using the within-region variation. The 21 regions correspond to administrative boundaries prevailing before the 2015 reform; they are closer to Pre-Revolutionary French provincial boundaries.<sup>25</sup> Finally, I test the robustness of my main results to several other potential confounders, including market potential, confiscation of land owned by *émigrés*, upper-tail human capital, literacy and religiosity.

## 4 Main Results

In presenting my main results, I first focus on the effect of land reallocation on agricultural productivity. I then test the robustness of my main results to other potential confounders and

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<sup>25</sup>For example, Lorraine, Alsace and Champagne are now part of the same region, whereas before 2015 they were three separate regions that corresponded more closely to the provinces before the Revolution.

to outliers.

## 4.1 The Effect of Land Reallocation on Agricultural Productivity

In Table 1, I report the estimations for specification (2) using OLS. The three dependent variables used to measure agricultural productivity are wheat yields (columns 1-3), the average days required to farm one hectare of wheat (columns 4-6), and the daily agricultural wage (columns 7-9). I first present the bivariate relationship for each dependent variable (columns 1,4 and 7) and then include my main control variables (columns 2, 5 and 8). Finally, I add region fixed effects to isolate the effect of land reallocation using the within-region variation (columns 3, 6 and 9).

The results show that *arrondissements* in which there was more extensive land reallocation, as proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, experienced higher levels of agricultural productivity in 1852. The relationship remains valid across all specifications, regardless of the measure of agricultural productivity, and is economically significant. For instance, column 3 suggests that a doubling of the monastic income exposure is associated with a 11% increase in wheat yields, conditional on my main controls and region fixed effects.<sup>26</sup> I find similar effects using alternative measures of agricultural productivity. Columns 6 and 9 suggest that a doubling in monastic income exposure leads to a 10% decrease in the average number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat and a 9% increase in the daily agricultural wage, conditional on my main controls and region fixed effects. The magnitude of the effect is in line with [Finley et al. \(2021\)](#).

These results, taken together, are consistent with a better land allocation among farmers following the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* and thus with an increase in agricultural productivity.

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<sup>26</sup>A doubling in monastic income exposure corresponds to a one-standard-deviation (5.76) increase in the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789. See column 5 in Table D-4.

Table 1: The Effect of Monastic Land Reallocation on Agricultural Productivity

Dependent variable:	log(Wheat yields)			log(Days per hectare of wheat)			log(Agricultural wage)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.26 (0.029)*** [0.030]***	0.24 (0.025)*** [0.027]***	0.11 (0.044)** [0.040]**	-0.14 (0.039)*** [0.038]***	-0.15 (0.037)*** [0.037]***	-0.10 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	0.15 (0.055)*** [0.058]***	0.18 (0.057)*** [0.059]***	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**
Caloric suitability	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruggedness	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Urban population in 1750	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.41	0.49	0.58	0.17	0.20	0.47	0.12	0.16	0.69

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on agricultural productivity in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. I use three different measures of agricultural productivity as dependent variable: wheat yields (columns 1-3), the average number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat (columns 4-6) and daily agricultural wage (columns 7-9). See Section B of the Appendix for more details on the variables used. For each dependent variable, I first display the bivariate relationship in the first column, then I include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) and finally I add region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



## 4.2 Robustness

In this section, I present the results of various robustness checks. Each column of Table 2 introduces the additional control variable specified at the top of that column to the main control variables and region fixed effects. The results for the dependent variables referenced in Table 1, namely wheat yields, labor days to farm one hectare of wheat, and daily agricultural wage, are set out in rows 1–3, respectively.

My main concern in this analysis is the endogeneity of monastic income and, in particular, the possibility that an omitted factor determines agricultural productivity and monastic income simultaneously before and after the Revolution. In columns 1 and 2, this issue is addressed using two different measures of economic development at the time of the French Revolution. First, market potential, by representing the potential demand for agricultural products, can influence both monastic income and farmers' incentives to supply agricultural products efficiently. I tackle this issue by constructing a measure of the market potential of each *arrondissement* at the time of the Revolution using the first comprehensive census of the French population, conducted in 1794.<sup>27</sup> This is a powerful measure of economic development since it is a comprehensive assessment of the size of French municipalities at the time of the French Revolution; it is included as a control in column 1. In column 2, I introduce an alternative measure of the level of economic development in 1789. Using data from Daudin (2010) and following Franck and Galor (2022), I proxy early market integration by computing the number of firms that sold their products outside of their home *arrondissements* in the 1790s. As reflected in columns 1 and 2, my main results are robust to the inclusion of these two potential confounders.

Another related concern is the endogeneity of monastic locations. It is possible that early monasteries targeted locations with higher levels of development to attract more donations com-

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<sup>27</sup>I define market potential for *arrondissement*  $a$  as the distance-weighted sum of the population of all French cities:  $MP_a = [\sum_j 1/d_{ac} \cdot Pop_c]$ , where  $Pop_c$  is the population of city  $c$  in 1794 and  $d_{ac}$  is the kilometric distance between the centroid of *arrondissement*  $a$  and city  $c$ . I consider as a city all municipalities with 1,000 or more inhabitants in 1794. When population is not available for year 1794, I use information of the next census of 1800. This is the case for only 2.3% of French municipalities.

Table 2: Robustness Checks

Added control:	Market Potential in 1794	Market Integration in 1790s	Urban Population in 700	% Emigré	Literacy in 1786	Subs. Density	% Refractory Priests	Banks in 1850	Distance to Paris	Distance to Bishops
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Wheat Yields	0.15 (0.041)*** [0.037]***	0.11 (0.044)** [0.040]**	0.10 (0.045)** [0.041]**	0.12 (0.039)*** [0.035]***	0.13 (0.045)*** [0.040]***	0.11 (0.044)** [0.041]**	0.13 (0.047)*** [0.042]***	0.11 (0.044)** [0.040]**	0.11 (0.044)** [0.040]**	0.11 (0.044)** [0.040]**
Days per hect.	-0.11 (0.039)*** [0.038]***	-0.10 (0.038)** [0.036]**	-0.11 (0.039)** [0.036]**	-0.10 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	-0.08 (0.033)** [0.032]**	-0.10 (0.038)** [0.035]**	-0.11 (0.040)** [0.038]**	-0.10 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	-0.08 (0.038)** [0.035]**	-0.10 (0.039)** [0.036]**
Agricultural Wage	0.05 (0.046) [0.042]	0.08 (0.039)** [0.035]**	0.08 (0.041)** [0.037]**	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**	0.10 (0.039)** [0.035]**	0.08 (0.039)** [0.036]**	0.08 (0.041)** [0.036]**	0.08 (0.040)** [0.037]**	0.05 (0.038) [0.035]	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	354	354	354	354	333	354	345	354	354	354

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, agricultural productivity in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. In each column, I test the sensitivity of my results to an additional control variable that is specified in the column header. See Section B of the Appendix for more details on the variables used. I use the same three dependent variables as in Table 1 to measure agricultural productivity. Each column controls for the caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness, urban population levels in 1750 and region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

ing from rich patrons. In column 3, I control for urban population levels in year 700; this is the year of the earliest population figure available for France using the data from [Buringh \(2021\)](#).<sup>28</sup> My main results remain unchanged, alleviating the selection concern. In Appendix Table [E-1](#) and [E-2](#), I verify further the robustness of my results to that potential issue, controlling for urban population in years 800, 900, 1000 and 1100. I obtain similar results.

I have also to consider that the French Revolution not only confiscated and auctioned Church properties, but also *émigrés* properties. *Emigrés* were supporters of the former regime, mostly aristocrats and churchmen, who fled France at the time of the Revolution ([Greer, 1951](#); [Franck and Michalopoulos, 2017](#)). Consequently, there is a possibility that my results are influenced by differences in the reallocation of *émigrés* land. I mitigate that concern by controlling for the share of *émigrés* in the population at the *département* level, using data from [Greer \(1951\)](#), as set out in column 4. My main results are unaffected.

In columns 5 and 6, I account for the possibility that my results are driven by differences in levels of human capital before the Revolution. First, upper-tail human capital, as captured by the density of *Encyclopédie* subscribers, might have affected the adoption of agricultural innovations and, as a result, agricultural productivity ([Squicciarini and Voigtländer, 2015](#)). Another possibility is that initial literacy levels were an determining factor in the adoption of agricultural innovations after the Revolution; in both cases, my main results are unaffected.

Another possibility is that the concentration of monasteries in certain places was linked to religiosity. This might have pushed *arrondissements* to specialize in the agricultural sector by hindering the diffusion of knowledge and innovation in other sectors. To assess that possibility, I follow [Squicciarini \(2020\)](#) and include as a control variable the share of refractory priests in 1791. Refractory priests were priests who refused to swear the oath of allegiance to the Civil Constitution of the newly formed French Republic. This expression of loyalty to the Catholic

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<sup>28</sup>The year 700 also corresponds to a period when relatively few monasteries were present in France. It is before the appearance of crucial monastic reforms which will lead to the foundation of the majority of French monasteries, such as the order of Cluny (910), the Cistercians (1098) or the Premonstratensians (1120).

Church is a proxy for religiosity at the local level (Tackett, 1986). As column 7 reveals, my main results are unaffected by religiosity.

As established in Section 2.1, the diffusion of agricultural machines during the first-half of the 19th was slow due to their cost. Consequently, access to financial services and especially credit is another factor potentially driving my results. To test the potential influence of financial development, in column 8, I control for the number of banks operating in each *arrondissement* between 1800 and 1851; my results are relatively unaffected.

Next, I investigate whether my main results are affected by the distance of each *arrondissement* to Paris and to bishoprics in 1789. First, as noted by Tocqueville (1967), the administrative and economic dominance of Paris in relation to the rest of the country was evident as early as the 17th century. This opens the possibility that proximity to the French capital simultaneously affected economic development and monastic income exposure. Second, in the course of the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*, all types of Church property were confiscated and auctioned. Even though monastic land represented the majority of confiscated properties (see Section 2.2), the possibility remains that my results are influenced by the confiscation of the property of other religious institutions such as bishoprics and archbishoprics. I find that my main results are robust to the distance to Paris (column 9) and to bishoprics and archbishoprics (column 10).

Appendix E sets out my additional robustness checks. First, I test the robustness of my results to the inclusion of other meaningful geographical distances capturing potential diffusion of technologies or trade opportunities. In Table E-3, I establish that the distance to London, Fresnes-sur-Escaut and major French harbors (Rouen, Nantes, Bordeaux and Marseilles) are not confounding my main results. I then check whether my results are driven by extreme observations by rerunning my analysis and trimming the top and bottom 5% of monastic income exposure. Table E-4 shows my main results are stable.

As an additional endogeneity test, I verify whether *arrondissements* with higher levels of

monastic income exposure were on specific trends before the Revolution. My concern is that, despite the rich set of control variables employed in the main analysis, *arrondissements* with higher monastic income exposure systematically differed in key characteristics affecting economic development and were already growing faster before the Revolution – i.e. where on a different trend than their counterparts. The only data available to assess this possibility is urban population data from [Buringh \(2021\)](#).

Table 3 presents regressions of rates of urban population growth in different periods on monastic income exposure in 1768. I find no consistent pattern systematically relating monastic income exposure and urban population growth prior to the French Revolution. In all specifications, the effect of monastic income exposure on urban population growth is small and statistically insignificant. This provides clear evidence that *arrondissements* with higher monastic income exposure were on the same general economic development path up to two centuries before the French Revolution. In particular, column 1 shows that there is no statistically significant effect of monastic income exposure on urban population growth fifty years before the Revolution; if any, the effect seems to be small and negative.

Table 3: Monastic Income Exposure and Trends before the French Revolution

Dep. var.: Urb. Pop. Growth	1750-1800 (1)	1700-1800 (2)	1600-1800 (3)	1700-1750 (4)	1600-1750 (5)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	-0.03 (0.043)	-0.00 (0.067)	0.00 (0.104)	0.02 (0.054)	0.07 (0.094)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	229	229	228	229	228
Adjusted $R^2$	0.12	0.15	0.10	0.06	0.04

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic income exposure in 1768 on urban population growth at the *arrondissement* level. The dependent variables are percent changes in urban population at the date specified in the column header. Each column controls for the caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness, initial urban population levels and region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 5 Mechanisms

In the previous section, I showed that the reallocation of monastic land improved agricultural productivity. In this section, I investigate plausible mechanisms linking land reallocation to productivity gains in agriculture. First, I examine how the reallocation of monastic land affected land inequality and land consolidation. In a second exercise, I study how this reallocation affected physical capital investments and labor force organization.

### 5.1 Land Inequality and Land Consolidation

As explained in Section 2.2, the confiscation and auctioning of monastic lands triggered by the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* opened the possibility for rich peasants and bourgeois to increase the size of their landholdings, driving land inequality. There is no consistent data measuring land inequality and land fragmentation in the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852. The first consistent data on land inequality is available from the *Enquête Agricole* of 1862, and at the *département* rather than *arrondissement* level. From this, I compute the average farm size to gauge land inequality in the mid-19th century. As an additional variable to measure land inequality, I calculate the share of large landowners in each *arrondissement* using data from the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852. I measure land fragmentation using data from Legoyt (1843) to compute the average number of parcels per owner at the *département* level. Even at the *département* level, the data can be useful for detecting fragmentation and persistent differences in landholdings patterns.

Table 4 reports regressions of monastic income exposure, proxying land reallocation, on the percentage of large landowners (columns 1-3), average farm size (columns 4-6) and the number of parcels per owner (columns 7-9). The results show that, on average, *arrondissements* with higher land reallocation had a larger proportion of large landowners and larger farms. In particular, column 3 shows that a doubling in monastic income exposure leads to a 6pp increase in the share of large landowners (one-third of a standard deviation), conditional to

my main controls and region fixed effects. Looking at the effect of land reallocation on the average farm size in column 6, I find statistically insignificant results. One possibility is that when region fixed effects are included, there is insufficient within-region variation remaining to estimate the effect. This is likely as farm size data are available at the *département* level, one NUTS level higher than *arrondissements*.<sup>29</sup> Reassuringly, the effect of land reallocation on farm size is positive and highly significant when I remove region fixed effects in column 5. The estimated effect is economically important; column 5 predicts that a doubling in monastic income exposure is associated with a 2.65-hectare increase in the average farm size in 1862 (46% of a standard deviation), conditional on caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750.

The results also indicate that *arrondissements* with higher land reallocation had less fragmented agricultural exploitations, as measured by the number of parcels per owner in 1843 (columns 7-9). Specifically, column 9 indicates that land reallocation has an economically large and statistically significant negative effect on land fragmentation. Indeed, a doubling in monastic income exposure lowers the number of parcels per owner by 1.45 (42% of a standard deviation).

Overall, I identify a consistent pattern indicating that the reallocation of monastic land following the French Revolution triggered an increase in land inequality and a decrease in land fragmentation.

## 5.2 Capital Investment

As established in the previous section, the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* initiated an increase in land inequality, allowing rich peasants and the bourgeois to purchase Church land and create large and less fragmented farms. [Galor and Zeira \(1993\)](#) and [Galor and Moav \(2004\)](#) argue that inequality is conducive to economic development when the prime engine of growth is physical capital accumulation. The logic is that, at early stages of development, inequality channels

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<sup>29</sup>In my sample, I have farm size data for 85 *départements*.

Table 4: The Effect of Monastic Land Reallocation on Land Inequality and Land Fragmentation

Dependent variable:	% Large landowners			Farm size			Parcels per owner		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.16 (0.015)*** [0.017]***	0.12 (0.018)*** [0.019]***	0.06 (0.027)** [0.025]**	3.38 (0.756)*** [0.623]***	2.65 (0.901)*** [0.759]***	-0.39 (0.905) [0.720]	-1.78 (0.534)*** [0.490]***	-1.77 (0.527)*** [0.493]***	-1.45 (0.599)** [0.548]**
Caloric suitability	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruggedness	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Urban population in 1750	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.40	0.52	0.60	0.22	0.30	0.68	0.13	0.15	0.56

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on land inequality and land fragmentation in the mid-19th century at the *arrondissement* level. I use the share of large landowners in 1852 (columns 1-3), the average size of an agricultural exploitation in 1862 (columns 4-6) and the number of parcels per owner in 1843 (columns 7-9) as dependent variables. See Section B of the Appendix for more details on the variables used. For each dependent variable, I first display the bivariate relationship in the first column, then I include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) and finally I add region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



resources towards individuals with a higher propensity to save, fostering investment and capital accumulation. Therefore, a plausible mechanism by which agricultural productivity could have improved is higher investment in physical capital and, in particular, mechanization.

To measure investments in physical capital in the agricultural sector, I take the number of scarifiers and extirpators reported in the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852. These plowing machines were used to lift, mix, clean and divide the earth before and after the harvest to facilitate the work of the plow and increase yields. They existed during the 18th century but diffused more broadly only after the Revolution: “The use of the extirpator in France is not very old, and its use is far from being as widespread as it should be” (Bixio, 1844, author’s translation p. 200). A possible explanation for the slow diffusion of these machines was their high price.<sup>30</sup> Only landowners that were sufficiently large could acquire such expensive physical capital.

In Table 5, I examine the relationship between land reallocation and investment in physical capital. As column 1 reveals, there is a positive and highly significant unconditional relationship between land reallocation and physical capital, as measured by the number of scarifiers and extirpators in 1852. This effect is robust across the different specifications. In particular, column 3 reveals a sizeable effect. The point estimates suggests that a doubling in monastic income exposure leads to a 76% increase in the number of scarifiers and extirpators.

The opportunity to increase productivity through mechanization was dependent on crop types. I investigate the importance of investment in physical capital, and therefore mechanization, to increasing agricultural productivity through a placebo test using vineyard yields. As wine production requires relatively less intensive use of physical capital than producing cereals, I expect that productivity gains were less marked for vineyards than wheat fields.

Table 6 compares the effect of land reallocation on vineyards yields (columns 1-3) and wheat yields (columns 4-6). Columns 1 and 2 reveal a positive effect of land reallocation on vineyard

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<sup>30</sup>About one hundred francs (Bixio, 1844). In comparison, the average French agricultural laborer was earning about 175 francs a year (based on the average daily wage and average working days of male agricultural laborers reported in the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852).

Table 5: The Effect of Monastic Land Reallocation on Mechanization

Dependent variable:	log(Scarifiers and extirpators)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.98 (0.184)*** [0.201]***	0.77 (0.206)*** [0.228]***	0.76 (0.364)** [0.295]**
Caloric suitability	No	Yes	Yes
Ruggedness	No	Yes	Yes
Urban population in 1750	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.09	0.12	0.21

*Notes:* This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on mechanization in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. I use the number of scarifiers and extirpators as dependent variable. See Section B of the Appendix for more details on the variables used. I first display the bivariate relationship in the first column, then I include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) and finally I add region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

yields. However, this becomes insignificant when I add region fixed effects in column 3. By contrast, the effect of land reallocation on wheat yields is positive and highly significant across all specifications (columns 4-6). This suggests that part of the effect of land reallocation on agricultural productivity is indeed the results of investment in physical capital.

### 5.3 Family Labor

As observed by Allen (1988), the rise of English labor productivity in the 18th century was partly the result of the substitution of family labor with the hiring of specialized labor. In particular, Allen (1988) notes that the per acre employment of women and children declined faster along farm size than that of men. To capture the gradual replacement of family labor by more specialized hired male workers hired on larger farms, I calculate the share of labor by women and children required to farm one hectare of wheat from the *Enquête Agricole* of 1852.

Table 7 shows that the effect of land reallocation on family labor is negative. This relationship is robust across all specifications. The results suggest that part of the positive effect of land

Table 6: The Effect of Monastic Land Reallocation on Productivity: Wine vs. Wheat

Dependent variable:	log(Vineyards yields)			log(Wheat yields)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.36 (0.048)*** [0.058]***	0.36 (0.058)*** [0.061]***	0.15 (0.101) [0.106]	0.27 (0.035)*** [0.043]***	0.27 (0.033)*** [0.038]***	0.14 (0.051)*** [0.047]***
Caloric suitability	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruggedness	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Urban population in 1750	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	279	279	279	279	279	279
Adjusted $R^2$	0.21	0.22	0.30	0.37	0.41	0.53

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on wine and wheat yields in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. I use two different dependent variables: wine yields (columns 1-3) and wheat yields (columns 4-6). See Section B of the Appendix for more details on the variables used. For each dependent variable, I first display the bivariate relationship in the first column, then I include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) and finally I add region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

reallocation on agricultural productivity was channelled through a decrease in family labor, as observed by Allen (1988) for 18th-century England.

Table 7: The Effect of Monastic Land Reallocation on Family Labor

Dependent variable:	% Female and child labor per hectare of wheat		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	-0.05 (0.015)*** [0.014]***	-0.05 (0.016)*** [0.015]***	-0.04 (0.018)** [0.017]**
Caloric suitability	No	Yes	Yes
Ruggedness	No	Yes	Yes
Urban population in 1750	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.10	0.12	0.48

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on family labor in agriculture in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. I use the share of female and child work required to farm one hectare of wheat as dependent variable. See Section B of the Appendix for more details on the variables used. I first display the bivariate relationship in the first column, then I include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) and finally I add region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## 6 Conclusion

This paper uses a historical setting to explore how a market-based land reallocation can affect agricultural productivity, and through which mechanisms. Focusing on French agriculture in the first-half of the 19th century, I analyze the consequences of the major land reform triggered by the French Revolution, known as the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*. Through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*, and in the span of five years, 6% of French land was confiscated and auctioned to secular owners. According to [Lecarpentier \(1908](#), author’s translation p. 4), this was “the most important event of the Revolution”. Specifically, I focus on the reallocation of monastic land, which represented a substantial part of Church land ([Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000](#)). The *Vente des Biens Nationaux* favored the emergence of capitalist farmers with large farms and mechanized production techniques. In contrast, areas with less monastic land were unable to establish large agricultural domains suited for mechanization.

Using data collected from primary and secondary sources, I proxy variations in monastic landholdings across French *arrondissements* before the Revolution using the income and location of each monastery. I show that areas with higher levels of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, had higher levels of agricultural productivity in the first-half of the 19th century. I shed light on the mechanism, focusing on the changes in farm size and land fragmentation introduced by the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*. I find that areas with higher levels of monastic land reallocation had larger and less fragmented farms in the mid-19th century. Consistent with [Galor and Zeira \(1993\)](#) and [Galor and Moav \(2004\)](#), I show that the land reallocation produced both an increase in inequality of land ownership and an increase in physical capital and agricultural productivity. Finally, consistent with [Allen \(1988\)](#), I provide evidence that land reallocation induced a substitution of family labor with the hiring of specialized male workers in agriculture.

The dissolution of French monasteries was part of a larger historical phenomenon, where secular powers throughout Europe were gradually attempting to control, or temper, the eco-

conomic importance of the Church and monasteries. These attempts, increasingly frequent since the Protestant Reformation, were both cause and consequence of the gradual modernization of European societies that continued with the Industrial Revolution. I view the investigation of the social and economic consequences of other historical episodes of dissolution and reallocation of monastic properties as a fruitful area for future research.

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
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## Appendix


### A Additional Figures

Figure A-1: Farm Size Changes in Artois (1750-1810)



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of farm size in the Artois region in 1750 and 1810 (Jessenne, 1987)

Figure A-2: Correlation between the percentage of Church Land Redistributed during the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* and Monastic Income Exposure – with controls



Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the percentage of Church land reallocated through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux* and log monastic income exposure in 1768. Residuals and coefficient estimates from Table D-4, column 6.

## B Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable	Definition and Source
<i>Dependent Variables</i>	
Wheat Yields	Average yield of wheat per hectare in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, as reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852.
Days per hectare of Wheat	Total number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852. In particular, it includes the time needed to perform all operations, including ploughing, sowing and harvesting and all types of labor force, including days from men, women, children and animals.
Agricultural Wage	Average daily wage of agricultural laborers in francs in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, as reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852.
Share of Large Landowners	Number of landowners “owning property in the <i>arrondissement</i> without residing there” and landowners “residing in the <i>arrondissement</i> but not cultivating themselves” over the total number of landowners in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, calculated using data as reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852.
Farm Size	Average size of a farm in hectares in an <i>département</i> in 1862, calculated using data reported by the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1862.
Parcels per Owner	Average number of parcels per owner in a <i>département</i> in 1843, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Legoyt (1843)</a> .
Scarifiers and Extirpators	Total number of scarifiers and extirpators in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, as reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852.
Vineyards Yields	Average product per hectare in hectolitres in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, as reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852.
Share of Female and Child Labor	Number of women’s and children’s days of labor required to farm one hectare of wheat over the total number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1852, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Marin and Marraud (2011)</a> from the <i>Enquête Agricole</i> of 1852.

(continued on next page)

Variable	Definition and Source
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>	
Monastic Income Exposure	Distance weighted sum of monastic incomes in <i>livres tournois</i> in an <i>arrondissement</i> in 1768, calculated using (1) and a distance cutoff of 100km. Data on monastic incomes and location comes from the <i>France Ecclésiastique</i> , the <i>Almanach Royal</i> and <a href="#">Lecestre (1902)</a> . For more details on the sources, see Section C of the Appendix.
Caloric Suitability	Average caloric yields given the set of crops that are suitable for cultivation before 1500 in an <i>arrondissement</i> , calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Galor and Özak (2016)</a> at a 5-degree resolution level.
Ruggedness	Average ruggedness index in an <i>arrondissement</i> , calculated using elevation data reported by <a href="#">Jarvis et al. (2008)</a> at a 5-degree resolution level.
Urban Population levels	Total urban population in an <i>arrondissement</i> in a given year, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Buringh (2021)</a> at the city level.
Market Potential in 1794	Distance-weighted sum of 1794 population levels in an <i>arrondissement</i> , calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Cassini and EHESS (2021)</a> at the city level. In particular, I consider as a city all municipalities with 1,000 or more inhabitants in 1794 and use the following formula: $MP_a = [\sum_j 1/d_{ac} \cdot Pop_c]$ , where $Pop_c$ is the population of city $c$ in 1794 and $d_{ac}$ is the kilometric distance between the centroid of <i>arrondissement</i> $a$ and city $c$ .
Market Integration in 1790s	Total external suppliers of an <i>arrondissement</i> in the 1790s, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Daudin (2010)</a> .
Share of <i>Emigrés</i>	Number of <i>Ancien Régime</i> supporters who fled France during the French Revolution ( <i>émigrés</i> ) over total population in a <i>département</i> in the 1790s, as reported by <a href="#">Greer (1951)</a> .
Literacy in 1786	Share of grooms who signed their wedding licenses with their names in a <i>département</i> over the 1786-1790 period (as opposed to those who marked it with a cross), as reported by <a href="#">Furet and Ozouf (1977)</a> .
Subscriber Density	Average density of <i>Encyclopédie</i> subscribers in an <i>arrondissement</i> in the 1750s, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2015)</a> at the city level.
Share of Refractory Priests	Average share of priests who refused to swear the oath of allegiance in 1791 in an <i>arrondissement</i> , calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Squicciarini (2020)</a> at the district level from <a href="#">Tackett (1986)</a> .

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Variable	Definition and Source
Banks in 1850	Total number of banks in activity in an <i>arrondissement</i> between 1800 and 1850, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Hoffman et al. (2019)</a> .
Distance to Paris	The distance in kilometers from Paris to the centroid of an <i>arrondissement</i> . Author's calculations.
Distance to Bishoprics in 1789	The distance in kilometers from bishoprics and archbishoprics in 1789 to the centroid of an <i>arrondissement</i> , calculated using data reported on <i>Wikipédia</i> .
<i>Dependent Variables used in Appendix</i>	
Share of Church Land in 1789	Hectares of land owned by a Church-related entity in 1789 (monasteries, bishoprics, etc.) over the total hectares, calculated using data reported by <a href="#">Finley et al. (2021)</a> at the district level from <a href="#">Bodinier and Teyssier (2000)</a> .
<i>Explanatory Variables used in Appendix</i>	
Distance to London	The distance in kilometers from London to the centroid of an <i>arrondissement</i> . Author's calculations.
Distance to Fresnes-sur-Escaut	The distance in kilometers from Fresnes-sur-Escaut to the centroid of an <i>arrondissement</i> . Author's calculations.
Distance to Major Harbours	The distance in kilometers from the nearest major French harbours of the 18th and 19th centuries (Rouen, Nantes, Bordeaux and Marseilles) to the centroid of an <i>arrondissement</i> . Author's calculations.

*Notes:* This table provides a description and the sources of all the variables used in our paper. Variables are displayed by order of apparition in tables.



## C Reconstructing Ancien Régime Monastic Incomes

In this section, I provide details on the sources and the construction used to reconstruct French monastic incomes before the Revolution. First, I give details about the historical sources. Then, I detail the construction of the database along with some stylized facts. Finally, I discuss the historical reliability of the sources.

### C.1 Sources

This section presents and introduces the sources used to reconstruct French monastic income before the Revolution.

I first rely on two primary sources: (i) the *France Ecclésiastique* and (ii) the *Almanach Royal* for the year 1768. The *France Ecclésiastique* is a directory of the Clergy, providing a list of all office holders in the French Clergy with typically their name, status, income and date of appointment. The *Almanach Royal* is an administrative directory, listing all office holders related to or appointed by the King, with typically their name, occupation, status, location and date of appointment. Both directories were published annually to keep the information up to date.

The *Almanach Royal* gives us the incomes of the commendatory abbots, while the *France Ecclésiastique* gives us information on the commendatory abbots and the regular abbots. In contrast with the rest of Europe, many French monasteries were still held *in commendam* at the end of the 18th century. This means that the abbot was directly appointed by the King. The commendatory abbot was a cleric or layman who received a share of monastery's income, without the obligation to live in the monastic house. This power was one of the many tools used by the king to reward and built loyalty of the nobles. Famous and prestigious people were even appointed commendatory abbot of several monasteries, thus cumulating income. This was the case for the famous Cardinal de Richelieu, who was simultaneously commendatory abbot of the most prestigious French abbeys such as Cîteaux, Cluny, Marmoutier and La Chaise-Dieu. In some cases, commendatory abbots were appointed very early in life, such as Louis de Bourbon-Condé who received Notre-Dame du Bec abbey in Normandy at the age of seven.

I supplement these data coming from primary sources with one secondary source. [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) compiles information on the annual income of all male monasteries in the Kingdom of France for the year 1766. This information comes from a general survey of the state of the monasteries, known as the *Commission des Réguliers*. On behalf of the King Louis XV, the commission decided on the closure of indigent monasteries, based on their annual income and the number of monks. The work of the *Commission des Réguliers* was targeted towards male

monasteries only. Therefore, all the information I have for female monasteries comes from the *France Ecclésiastique* and the *Almanach Royal*.

## C.2 Construction of the Database

In this section, I provide extensive details on the process of data collection, data selection and I provide some summary statistics.

As my two primary sources are available on an annual basis, I target the year 1768 to be able to compare and extend the coverage of the data provided by [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) and the *Commission des Réguliers* (1768). To illustrate my data collection, Figure C-3 displays the first page of the three sources that I use, with a visualization of the available information. I first geolocated each monastery using its name (A) and bishoprics (B). The precise geographic coordinates were found using *Wikipédia* or other secondary sources. For male monasteries, I have benefited greatly from the work of [Lecestre \(1902\)](#), which already provides the *département*, *canton* or even the *commune* in which each monastery is located in the year 1902. I collect the annual income of each monastery in *livres tournois* as such (C). Some additional information has been systematically collected, such as the monastic order (D). This information is also important to identify each monastery, as many homonyms are present in the raw data.

My dataset includes all the monasteries and priories for which I have the income from at least one of the three aforementioned sources, and sufficient informations to geolocate them.<sup>31</sup> Figure C-4 shows the geographic distribution of the 1,545 monasteries included in my database. Monasteries were widespread in France. In fact, only 21 (5.8%) *arrondissements* have no monasteries. The highest concentration is found in the *arrondissement* of Paris, with 31 monasteries. The average *arrondissement* had 4.3 monasteries (standard deviation of 3.46).

In my analysis, I do not consider monasteries belonging to the mendicant orders (Franciscans and Dominicans, among others). This is because mendicant orders depended on pure charity to live and were not supposed to hold properties. Consequently, they are not relevant to study the effect of land reallocation on agricultural productivity. Mendicant orders appear insignificant in terms of income, since they represent only 18% of the total monastic income for the year 1768; whereas they represent nearly 60% of the total number of monasteries ([Lecestre, 1902](#), p. 120).

On the contrary, I have chosen to keep in my database the monasteries closed by the *Commission des Réguliers* for two main reasons: (i) the decision took a long time to be enforced, and we have anecdotal evidence of monasteries that remained in activity despite the decision to

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<sup>31</sup>I failed to locate only 16 monasteries.

Figure C-3: Example of Information from my Sources

LISTE GÉNÉRALE  
DES  
ABBAYES, PRIEURÉS ET COUVENTS  
D'HOMMES EN 1768.

RÈGLE DE SAINT BENOIT

B		D		C	
		ANCIENS BÉNÉDICTINS.			
Diocèses	A MAIRONS	Nombre de religieux	Revenu en livres		
Agen . . .	Eysses. — Lot-et-Garonne, comm.	8	7.000		
Alais . . .	Villeneuve-sur-Lot . . . . .	—	—		
	Cendras. — Gard, cant. Alais.				
	Supprimé anciennement.				
Amiens . . .	Forestmontiers. — Somme, cant				
	Le Nouvion-en-Ponthieu. . . .	"4	3.800		
	Moreuil. — Somme, arr. Montidi-				
	dier. . . . .	3	2.500		
Angers . . .	Chemillé. — Maine-et-Loire, arr.				
	Cholet. . . . .	"4	2.200		
Angoulême . . .	Saint-Amand-de-Boixe. — Cha-				
	rente, arr. Angoulême. . . . .	"2	1.200		
	Bournet. — Charente, arr. Barbe-				
	zieux, comm. Courgeac. . . . .	"3	1.000		
	Saint-Cybard, à Angoulême. . . .	"7	4.000		
Arras . . .	Anchin. — Nord, comm. Pecquen-				
	court. . . . .	43	170.000		
	Berclau. — Pas-de-Calais, comm.				
	Billy-Berclau. . . . .	"4	15.000		
	Douay (collège). Dépend de Saint-				
	Vaast . . . . .	8	—		

(a) Lecestre (1902)

CHAPITRE IV.  
ABBAYES ET ABBÉS  
COMMENDATAIRES.

*Leur ordre & leur taxe en Cour de Rome ;  
leur Diocèse & leur revenu ;  
Les Abbés Commendataires & leurs qualités.*

Les lettres suivantes désignent ,

A l'Ordre de S. Augustin. | C celui de Cîteaux.  
B celui de S. Benoît. | S les Abbayes Séculières.  
P celui de Prémontré.

A	B	D	C
L'ABBE, la Rochelle.	100 fl.	1000 l.	
1753, de Chalabre, V. G. de Carcassonne.			
Acey, Besançon, C	80 fl.	6000 l.	
1766, du Cheylar, Aum. de la Reine.			
S. Atheuil, Amiens, A	180 fl.	5000 l.	
1760, le Gros, V. G. de Rheims.			
Abun, Limoges, B	200 fl.	1200 l.	
1747, l'Eglise.			
Aiguebelle, S. P. 3 Châteaux, C	1500 fl	3000 l.	
1762, de Peinier, Chan. de S. Victor de M.			

(b) La France Ecclésiastique

semblées du Clergé.  
Le Roy nomme aux Archevêchez & Evêchez, à 770 Abbayes d'homme, & à plus de 317 tant Abbayes que Prieurez de filles.  
Il y a dans ce Royaume 250 Commanderies de l'Ordre de S. Jean de Jérusalem dit de Malte, & autrefois de Rhodes ; sçavoir 200 pour les Chevaliers, & 50 tant pour les Chapelains que pour les Servans d'Armes. Dans le nombre des Commanderies de Chevaliers sont compris six Grands-Prieurez & quatre Baillages, dignitez affectées aux Grands-Croix.

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
A B B A Y E S E T A B B E Z Commendataires,  
Leur taxe en Cour de Rome, & leur revenu.

A signifie que l'Abbaye est de l'Ordre de St Augustin ; B, de l'Ordre de S. Benoît ; C, de Cîteaux ; P ; de Prémontré ; S, séculier.

Nom.	Abb.	Titul.	Dioc.	Flor.	Revenu.	Ordre.
1766	A	Cey, du Chavlar, Besançon,	80 fl.	6000 l.		C
1747	A	Abun, Léglise, Limoges,	200 fl.	1200 l.		B
1762		Aiguebelle, de Peiner ; S. Paul-Trois-Châteaux,	2500 fl.	3000 l.		C
1760		Aiguevive, Noguier, Tours,	120 fl.	2100 l.		A
1759		Airvaux, Stoupy, la Rochelle,	350 fl.	5000 l.		A
1758		Aisnay, de Jarente, Lyon,	317 fl.	31000 l.		S
1765		Ambournay, de Murat, Lyon,	473 fl.	12000 l.		B
1751		Anchin, le Cardinal d'Yorch, Arras,	4000 fl.	70000 l.		B

(c) Almanach Royal

Figure C-4: Spatial Distribution of Monasteries



*Notes:* This figure plots the spatial distribution of French monasteries in year 1768. Note that all existing French monasteries of that time are not displayed on this map. See text for more informations.

close them; (ii) even if a monastery was closed, its properties were given to other monasteries, and finally redistributed at the time of the Revolution.

In many cases, monastic income for a single monastery is available from more than one source. To use monastic income in my empirical analysis, I therefore assign a single income value to each monastery based on a simple criterion: for each monastery, I take the maximum income given by one of the three sources. This approach is also motivated by the fact that monasteries may have tended to reduce their income so as not to attract too much attention from the ecclesiastical or royal authorities. In all cases, the pairwise correlation between each source is very high, as shown in Table C-1.

Table C-2 summarizes the composition of my final dataset by source. It appears that I rely

Table C-1: Correlations between Sources

	Income from the <i>France Ecclésiastique</i>	Income from the <i>Almanach Royal</i>	Income from <a href="#">Lecestre (1902)</a>
Income from the <i>France Ecclésiastique</i>	1		
Income from the <i>Almanach Royal</i>	0.96	1	
Income from <a href="#">Lecestre (1902)</a>	0.63	0.79	1

Notes: This table presents the pairwise correlation coefficients between the three sources of data I used on monastic income.

predominantly on the secondary source (63.6%) of [Lecestre \(1902\)](#). Nevertheless, a substantial share of the primary sources is used as well (37%). One explanation is that [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) also gives the annual income of the priories, what is not taken into account at all in the primary sources which focus on abbeys. As detailed in next section, another explanation could be that the income reported by [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) (from the *Commission des Réguliers*), were systematically closer to the true income values, since the *Commission* had more investigative powers.

Table C-2: Number of Observations and Frequency by Source

	<i>France Ec- clésiastique</i>	<i>Almanach Royal</i>	<a href="#">Lecestre (1902)</a>	<i>Fr. Ecclé. and Almanach</i>	<a href="#">Lecestre (1902)</a> and <i>Fr. Ecclé</i>	<a href="#">Lecestre (1902)</a> and <i>Almanach</i>	The Three Sources	Total
Number obs.	133	169	966	267	3	3	4	1545
%	8.6%	11%	62.5%	17.3%	0.19%	0.19%	0.26%	100%

Notes: This table presents the contribution of each source to the final database on monastic income that I use in the article.

### C.3 Reliability of the Historical Sources

In this section, I discuss the reliability and the validity of the three historical sources used to reconstruct monastic incomes before the Revolution with respect to the historical literature.

First, we do not know precisely the authors and the sources on which the *France Ecclésiastique* or the *Almanach Royal* are based. Despite that fact, several pieces of evidence, direct or indirect, suggest that this data are relatively accurate. First, the *Almanach Royal* was a commercial enterprise. The idea of its creator, Laurent d'Houry, was to publish an almanac accompanied with useful administrative information, such as the names and addresses of the intendants of finances, or the days of departure for the postal services. The *Almanach Royal* was thus always dedicated to inform a wide audience, as opposed to inform a particular administration or corporation ([Brondel, 2008](#)). Nevertheless, since its creation, the *Almanach*

was closely related to the king, the royal court and the Parisian elites.<sup>32</sup> The link between the editors of the *Almanach* and the monarchical power was crucial for several reasons. First, during the *Ancien Régime*, the publishing market, like any other type of business, was heavily regulated. The commercialization of a book required an explicit authorization from the King – i.e. a privilege – granting the publisher a monopoly on the printing and sale of copies. This system of privileges was also a way for the monarchy to control the diffusion and content of books. Obtaining the right to print the book was conditional on the approval of a royal censor, who was responsible for reading the book. This constituted a first control on the quality of the information contained in the *Almanach*. It is known that successive editors of the *Almanach* managed to have their privilege renewed year after year for almost a century, until the French Revolution (Brondel, 2008). Second, the connexion between the editors of the *Almanach*, the royal court and the Parisian elites was crucial in the making of the *Almanach* itself. Indeed, to keep information up to date, the editors of the *Almanach* used two strategies: (i) a network of paid informants and (ii) reader feedback. Unfortunately, little is known about the paid informants. Brondel (2008) explains that this was an expensive and little used method. On the contrary, we have more evidence of corrected erroneous information through letters sent to the editor in Paris. On that element, Brondel (2008) emphasizes that the wide diffusion of the *Almanach* in the administration and savant societies was a crucial element. This provide a powerful check on the content of the *Almanach*. Anecdotally, we know that Laurent d’Houry was in prison for three weeks in 1716. His crime was to report erroneous information about the King of England in the *Almanach*, provoking a diplomatic incident between the two kingdoms. Although not official under the *Ancien Régime*, the *Almanach* is nevertheless considered as “reliable, complete and almost official” by Brondel (2008). All these elements point to the relative quality of the information presented in the *Almanach*.

As for the *Almanach Royal*, we do not know the authors of the *France Ecclésiastique*. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any historical study analyzing this publication either. However, it is clear that the information contained in the *France Ecclésiastique* is of a similar quality to that of the *Almanach* and for the same reasons. Indeed, as with the *Almanach*, the *France Ecclésiastique* was printed with the king’s privilege and read by the royal censor. Moreover, the preamble of the *France Ecclésiastique* clearly encourages the reader to send comments on erroneous information. Finally, Table C-1 shows that the pairwise correlation between the monastic income posted in the *France Ecclésiastique* and the *Almanach Royal* is 0.96, confirming that the source on which those publications were based are the same.

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<sup>32</sup>The adjective *royal* was placed by the founder of the almanac, Laurent d’Houry, after its successful presentation to king Louis XIV in 1699.

Concerning [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) and the *Commission des Réguliers*, we can consider the information of this source as reliable. Indeed, the information came from a commission acting on behalf of the king (see Section [C.1](#)). This commission was headed by archbishoprics and state councillors, that is among the highest civil and religious authority of the kingdom. One can therefore legitimately think that these authorities exerted the necessary pressure on the monasteries to obtain precise information on their income. Each monastery sent its income statement to the mother house of its religious congregation. Indications furnished by bishops were also used to establish the annual income of each monastery. [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) judges these figures as accurate, although presumably lower than the actual figures. In all cases, we can see that the correlation between [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) and the primary sources used is high, indicating that the information is globally consistent. Note that the differences with respect to [Lecestre \(1902\)](#) could be due to the fact that it reports the net income and not the gross income of monasteries, as primary sources do.



## D Cross-Checking Analysis

In this section, we empirically test the validity of our data on monastic income and our main dependent variable – i.e. monastic income exposure. We start by testing the relationship between monastic income and the type and number of monastic properties at the monastery level. Then, we test the relationship between monastic income and the dispersion of monastic properties from the monastic house. Finally, we test the ability of monastic income exposure to capture the redistribution of Church land at the *arrondissement* level.

### D.1 Monastic Income and Monastic Landholdings

This section presents evidence about the link between monastic income and monastic landholdings at the monastery level – i.e. first cross-checking exercise. To do so, I use data compiled by Bodinier (1988) on the number/size and type of properties owned by French monastery in the Eure or Seine-Maritime *département* in 1789.<sup>33</sup> From this dataset, I can therefore compute the number of hectares of agricultural land, woods, vineyards or wastelands owned by 45 monasteries located in these two *départements* along with informations on other economic assets such as mills, houses, markets, justice courts, chapels, etc.

Table D-1 establishes that monastic income accurately captures differences in hectares of agricultural land across monasteries. Other types of properties, such as mills, houses or barns, have no predictive power on monastic income (columns 2 and 3). In particular, from column 4 on, I include factors such as the caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness, population, trade and distance to administrative centres as potential confounders of the relationship of interest at the monastery level. In the last two columns, I add *département* fixed effects (column 8) and *arrondissement* fixed effects (column 9) to further control for potential confounders at these levels. In all cases, the relationship between monastic income and hectares of agricultural land remains positive and highly significant.

Table D-2 supplements the previous analysis using the number of farms instead of hectares of agricultural land as explanatory variable. I find similar results with a strong positive and significant relationship between monastic income and the number of farms across all the specifications.

The analysis conducted in Tables D-1 and D-2 is also useful to verify whether the collected data on monastic income in the *France Ecclésiastique*, the *Almanach Royal* and Lecestre (1902) correlate with any of the monastic properties identified. This was a crucial validation step,

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<sup>33</sup>We warmly thank Bernard Bodinier for sharing his data with us. The data come from his doctoral thesis and his personal notes for the Seine-Maritime *département*.



especially since we do not really know the authors and sources on which these figures are based (see section C.3).

## D.2 Monastic Income Exposure and Church Land Reallocation

This section presents evidence about the ability of monastic income exposure to capture most of the variations in monastic landholdings at the *arrondissement* level – i.e. second cross-checking exercise. To test this, I use data collected by Bodinier and Teyssier (2000) on the percentage of Church land redistributed in French districts through the *Vente des Biens Nationaux*. These data are available for only 40% of the French *arrondissements* I use in my main analysis.

Table D-3 establishes that (i) monastic income exposure is a relevant proxy, capturing most of the cross-*arrondissement* variations in Church’s landholdings, and that (ii) spatial spillovers of monastic incomes within a 100km radius are crucial to accurately capture this variation.

Indeed, the best fit between the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 and monastic income exposure is obtained when I consider a distance cutoff of 100km (column 5). In particular, column 5 shows that monastic income exposure with a distance cutoff of 100km explains more than half of the variation in the percentage of Church land redistributed at the Revolution. A 100km cutoff means that I set the spatial weights in (1) to zero for all monasteries more than 100km away from the centroid of a given *arrondissement*. I therefore consider monasteries that are more than 100km away as not being able to own a large amount of land in a given *arrondissement*. This is consistent with the historical evidence showing that most monasteries had their properties concentrated around the cloister (Bodinier and Teyssier, 2000; Goudot, 2006; Wilkin, 2011).<sup>34</sup>

Interestingly, the worst fit is found in column 1, where I do not consider any spatial spillovers of monastic income. In that case, only 16% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by monastic income exposure. In particular, I define monastic income exposure in that case as the sum of monastic income only for monasteries that are included within the boundaries of a given *arrondissement*, namely  $MIE_a = \sum_{m \in a} I_m$ .

Table D-4 establishes that the relationship between monastic income exposure (with a 100km cutoff) and the percentage of Church land redistributed at the Revolution found in column 5, Table D-3, is not confounded by other explanatory variables. In particular, the relationship between monastic income exposure and the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 remains positive and highly significant across all the specifications, controlling for the agricultural potential of the land, ruggedness, urbanization, distance to bishoprics and region

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<sup>34</sup>See Section 3.1 for a complete discussion of that implication regarding to monastic income exposure.

fixed effects.

In column 7, I run a horse race regression, adding monastic income exposure (without spatial spillovers) on top of all the aforementioned control variables. My results are unchanged, with the relationship of interest between monastic income exposure (100km cutoff) and the percentage of Church land redistributed still positive and highly significant.

Table D-1: Determinants of Monastic Income

Dep. log(Monastic Income)	Var.:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(Hectares)		0.62*** (0.111)	0.38*** (0.060)	0.42*** (0.104)	0.44*** (0.115)	0.53*** (0.132)	0.51*** (0.143)	0.50*** (0.152)	0.50*** (0.151)	0.61** (0.197)
log(1+Woods)			-0.06 (0.061)	-0.06 (0.061)	-0.06 (0.069)	-0.06 (0.060)	-0.06 (0.046)	-0.06 (0.048)	-0.06 (0.076)	-0.05 (0.115)
log(1+Vineyards)			0.17 (0.166)	0.16 (0.157)	0.18 (0.119)	0.16 (0.158)	0.13 (0.198)	0.14 (0.213)	0.14 (0.227)	0.31 (0.272)
log(1+Fallow)			-0.02 (0.050)	-0.02 (0.044)	-0.00 (0.029)	-0.01 (0.039)	0.00 (0.039)	0.01 (0.037)	0.01 (0.060)	-0.12 (0.070)
Houses			0.01 (0.027)	0.02 (0.026)	0.02 (0.028)	0.03 (0.028)	0.04 (0.034)	0.04 (0.036)	0.04 (0.035)	0.03 (0.024)
Mills			0.10 (0.067)	0.07 (0.078)	0.05 (0.082)	0.01 (0.072)	-0.07 (0.089)	-0.06 (0.093)	-0.06 (0.084)	-0.10 (0.120)
Barns			-0.07 (0.091)	-0.09 (0.077)	-0.05 (0.079)	-0.05 (0.063)	0.04 (0.070)	0.02 (0.060)	0.02 (0.046)	-0.00 (0.063)
Priories			0.11 (0.099)	0.10 (0.095)	0.09 (0.097)	0.05 (0.067)	0.03 (0.048)	0.05 (0.044)	0.05 (0.045)	0.01 (0.105)
Manors			0.01 (0.164)	-0.01 (0.158)	-0.08 (0.201)	-0.05 (0.189)	-0.16 (0.234)	-0.17 (0.228)	-0.17 (0.216)	-0.12 (0.147)
Markets			0.05 (0.333)	0.10 (0.344)	-0.06 (0.337)	0.03 (0.301)	0.11 (0.499)	0.11 (0.512)	0.11 (0.497)	0.31 (0.499)
Courts			0.24 (0.349)	0.27 (0.321)	0.44 (0.324)	0.49 (0.347)	0.45 (0.549)	0.51 (0.581)	0.51 (0.586)	1.11** (0.445)
Chapels			0.15* (0.079)	0.18*** (0.053)	0.12 (0.082)	0.17 (0.091)	0.09 (0.086)	0.11 (0.078)	0.11 (0.104)	0.12 (0.125)
Benedictines				0.22 (0.222)	0.33 (0.221)	0.43* (0.213)	0.42* (0.187)	0.39* (0.209)	0.39 (0.252)	0.44 (0.243)
Female				0.09 (0.207)	0.01 (0.182)	0.08 (0.201)	-0.02 (0.184)	-0.00 (0.206)	-0.00 (0.204)	0.08 (0.302)
Cal. Suit. 20km					0.12 (0.474)	-0.14 (0.621)	-2.13* (1.035)	-2.41* (1.107)	-2.41 (2.445)	-1.31 (3.756)
Rugg. 20km					0.58 (0.328)	0.90** (0.363)	0.59* (0.321)	0.54 (0.381)	0.54 (0.410)	-0.37 (1.441)
Pop. 20km						-0.52** (0.221)	-1.12*** (0.279)	-1.15*** (0.276)	-1.15*** (0.290)	-1.13** (0.494)
Dist. Seine							-0.34** (0.127)	-0.34** (0.128)	-0.34** (0.132)	-0.42 (0.283)
Dist. <i>Dép.</i>								-0.05 (0.039)	-0.05 (0.052)	-0.11 (0.079)
<i>Dép.</i> FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
<i>Arrond.</i> FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
VIF	1.00	4.78	4.47	4.45	4.45	4.74	4.85	5.33	9.19	
adj. R-sq	0.52	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.60	0.70	0.70	0.68	0.66	

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of hectares of agricultural land owned by a monastery in 1789 on monastic income in 1768 at the *monastery* level. Up to column 3, all variables are computed using data from Bodinier (1988). From column 4 on, I include the controls specified in the first column of the table. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table D-2: Determinants of Monastic Income – alternative specification

Dep. log(Monastic Income)	Var.:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(1+Farms)		0.59*** (0.085)	0.31*** (0.062)	0.31*** (0.063)	0.31*** (0.074)	0.32*** (0.065)	0.32*** (0.080)	0.31*** (0.093)	0.31** (0.098)	0.39** (0.154)
log(1+Woods)			-0.01 (0.057)	-0.00 (0.057)	0.01 (0.068)	0.01 (0.064)	0.01 (0.051)	0.01 (0.055)	-0.00 (0.090)	0.01 (0.116)
log(1+Vineyards)			0.11 (0.194)	0.11 (0.189)	0.14 (0.143)	0.14 (0.156)	0.11 (0.176)	0.12 (0.194)	0.13 (0.205)	0.25 (0.386)
log(1+Fallow)			-0.00 (0.065)	-0.00 (0.065)	0.01 (0.050)	0.01 (0.053)	0.02 (0.039)	0.03 (0.044)	0.02 (0.069)	-0.12 (0.087)
Houses			0.01 (0.025)	0.01 (0.027)	0.02 (0.030)	0.02 (0.030)	0.03 (0.036)	0.03 (0.038)	0.03 (0.037)	0.02 (0.040)
Mills			0.10 (0.067)	0.09 (0.075)	0.07 (0.084)	0.05 (0.081)	-0.03 (0.090)	-0.02 (0.095)	-0.01 (0.104)	-0.02 (0.137)
Barns			-0.09 (0.093)	-0.10 (0.084)	-0.07 (0.079)	-0.07 (0.071)	0.02 (0.081)	-0.00 (0.068)	-0.01 (0.060)	-0.04 (0.070)
Priories			0.10 (0.106)	0.09 (0.094)	0.10 (0.102)	0.08 (0.087)	0.06 (0.053)	0.08 (0.045)	0.08 (0.045)	0.04 (0.107)
Manors			0.05 (0.162)	0.05 (0.168)	-0.01 (0.215)	0.02 (0.221)	-0.10 (0.219)	-0.11 (0.219)	-0.09 (0.235)	-0.05 (0.285)
Markets			-0.01 (0.350)	0.01 (0.381)	-0.11 (0.384)	-0.07 (0.367)	0.02 (0.551)	0.02 (0.565)	0.01 (0.555)	0.13 (0.646)
Courts			0.38 (0.350)	0.41 (0.343)	0.49 (0.362)	0.53 (0.371)	0.49 (0.563)	0.55 (0.594)	0.55 (0.610)	1.39** (0.595)
Chapels			0.09 (0.076)	0.10 (0.067)	0.07 (0.088)	0.09 (0.100)	0.02 (0.075)	0.05 (0.070)	0.04 (0.099)	0.02 (0.088)
Benedictines				0.11 (0.173)	0.16 (0.180)	0.20 (0.181)	0.19 (0.141)	0.16 (0.174)	0.15 (0.221)	0.08 (0.237)
Female				0.05 (0.203)	0.02 (0.173)	0.05 (0.182)	-0.05 (0.169)	-0.03 (0.190)	-0.03 (0.200)	0.04 (0.263)
Cal. 20km					-0.42 (0.771)	-0.58 (0.750)	-2.61*** (0.761)	-2.95*** (0.817)	-3.12 (2.008)	-2.63 (3.492)
Rug. 20km					0.39 (0.332)	0.54 (0.315)	0.24 (0.404)	0.17 (0.462)	0.17 (0.488)	-0.30 (1.578)
Pop. 20km						-0.27 (0.217)	-0.90** (0.282)	-0.94*** (0.261)	-0.94*** (0.276)	-0.95* (0.490)
Dist. Seine							-0.34** (0.139)	-0.35** (0.140)	-0.35** (0.141)	-0.37 (0.294)
Dist. <i>Dép.</i>								-0.06 (0.037)	-0.06 (0.044)	-0.07 (0.098)
<i>Dép.</i> FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
<i>Arrond.</i> FE	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Obs.	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
VIF	1.00	4.65	4.32	4.33	4.27	4.57	4.67	4.67	5.14	9.06
adj. R-sq	0.51	0.58	0.56	0.54	0.54	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.55

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of hectares of agricultural land owned by a monastery in 1789 on monastic income in 1768 at the *monastery* level. Up to column 3, all variables are computed using data from Bodinier (1988). From column 4 on, I include the controls specified in the first column of the table. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table D-3: Distance Calibration of Monastic Income Exposure

Dep. Var.: % Church Land Redistributed in 1789	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\log(\text{MIE}, \sum_{m \in a} I_m)$	1.26*** (2.816)								
$\log(\text{MIE}, 25\text{km cutoff})$		1.18*** (3.309)							
$\log(\text{MIE}, 50\text{km cutoff})$			5.07*** (6.822)						
$\log(\text{MIE}, 75\text{km cutoff})$				5.91*** (7.602)					
$\log(\text{MIE}, 100\text{km cutoff})$					6.17*** (7.996)				
$\log(\text{MIE}, 125\text{km cutoff})$						6.34*** (7.779)			
$\log(\text{MIE}, 150\text{km cutoff})$							6.48*** (7.653)		
$\log(\text{MIE}, 200\text{km cutoff})$								6.54*** (7.166)	
$\log(\text{MIE}, \text{no cutoff})$									11.14*** (6.794)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Region fixed effects	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
Adjusted $R^2$	0.16	0.17	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.50	0.48

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic income exposure in 1768 on the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 at the *arrondissement* level. In each line, I use a different way of calculating monastic income exposure in (1) starting from no spatial spillovers (column 1) to no distance cutoff (column 9). Standard errors are clustered at the *département* level. *t*-stats are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table D-4: The Effect of Monastic Income Exposure on the Percentage of Church Land Redistributed in 1789

Dep. Var.: % Church Land Redis- tributed in 1789	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
log(MIE, 100km cutoff)	6.17*** (0.772)	6.20*** (0.774)	5.92*** (0.792)	5.80*** (0.781)	5.75*** (0.752)	4.85*** (0.918)	4.50*** (0.894)
Caloric suitability		1.19 (2.332)	0.88 (2.379)	0.89 (2.333)	0.40 (2.218)	2.04 (3.438)	2.15 (3.392)
Ruggedness			-0.66* (0.380)	-0.65* (0.389)	-0.82** (0.395)	-0.09 (1.281)	-0.10 (1.265)
Urban population in 1750				0.33* (0.179)	0.11 (0.230)	-0.06 (0.257)	-0.09 (0.260)
log(Distance to Bishoprics)					-0.29 (0.204)	-0.39 (0.275)	-0.35 (0.274)
log(MIE, $\sum_{m \in a} I_m$ )							0.25* (0.131)
Region fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
Adjusted $R^2$	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.63	0.63

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic income exposure in 1768 on the percentage of Church land redistributed in 1789 at the *arrondissement* level. Column 1 displays the bivariate relationship, then I gradually include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) in columns 2-4. Column 5 adds the distance to nearest bishoprics in 1789 and column 6 adds region fixed effects. Finally, I control for an alternative version of monastic income exposure that ignores spatial spillovers in column 7. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## **E Additional Robustness Checks**

Table E-1: Additional Robustness Checks – controlling for urban population levels in the Middle Ages

Added control:	Urban population in 700			Urban population in 800			Urban population in 900		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.10 (0.045)** [0.041]**	-0.11 (0.039)*** [0.036]***	0.08 (0.041)** [0.037]**	0.11 (0.045)** [0.041]**	-0.10 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**	0.11 (0.045)** [0.041]**	-0.10 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	0.09 (0.040)** [0.037]**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.58	0.47	0.69	0.58	0.47	0.69	0.58	0.47	0.69

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on agricultural productivity in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. In each column, I test the sensitivity of my results to an additional control variable that is specified in the column header. Each column changes its dependent variable. In particular, I use wheat yields in columns 1, 4 and 7, the average number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat in columns 2, 5 and 8 and daily agricultural wage in columns 3, 6 and 9 as dependent variables. Each column controls for the caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness, urban population levels in 1750 and region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



Table E-2: Additional Robustness Checks – controlling for further urban population levels in the Middle Ages

Added control:	Urban population in 1000			Urban population in 1100		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.11 (0.045)** [0.041]**	-0.11 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**	0.11 (0.045)** [0.041]**	-0.10 (0.038)*** [0.036]***	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	354	354	354	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.58	0.47	0.69	0.58	0.47	0.69

*Notes:* This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on agricultural productivity in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. In each column, I test the sensitivity of my results to an additional control variable that is specified in the column header. Each column changes its dependent variable. In particular, I use wheat yields in columns 1 and 4, the average number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat in columns 2 and 5 and daily agricultural wage in columns 3 and 6 as dependent variables. Each column controls for the caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness, urban population levels in 1750 and region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and [Conley \(1999\)](#) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table E-3: Additional Robustness Checks – controlling for distances

Added control:	Distance to London			Distance to Fresnes-sur-Escout			Distance to Major Harbours		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.12 (0.042)*** [0.038]***	-0.08 (0.036)** [0.033]**	0.09 (0.040)** [0.036]**	0.10 (0.048)* [0.045]*	-0.11 (0.040)*** [0.038]***	0.08 (0.040)** [0.038]**	0.11 (0.045)** [0.040]**	-0.10 (0.040)** [0.038]**	0.07 (0.041)* [0.036]*
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354	354
Adjusted $R^2$	0.58	0.49	0.69	0.58	0.47	0.69	0.58	0.47	0.70

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on agricultural productivity in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. In each column, I test the sensitivity of my results to an additional control variable that is specified in the column header. Each column changes its dependent variable. In particular, I use wheat yields in columns 1, 4 and 7, the average number of days required to farm one hectare of wheat in columns 2, 5 and 8 and daily agricultural wage in columns 3, 6 and 9 as dependent variables. Each column controls for the caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness, urban population levels in 1750 and region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table E-4: Additional Robustness Checks – trimmed sample

Dependent variable:	log(Wheat yields)			log(Days per hectare of wheat)			log(Agricultural wage)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(Monastic Income Exposure)	0.30 (0.034)*** [0.034]***	0.26 (0.032)*** [0.031]***	0.09 (0.044)** [0.039]**	-0.21 (0.034)*** [0.037]***	-0.22 (0.035)*** [0.038]***	-0.14 (0.050)*** [0.048]***	0.23 (0.052)*** [0.054]***	0.25 (0.054)*** [0.054]***	0.10 (0.049)** [0.045]**
Caloric suitability	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ruggedness	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Urban population in 1750	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Region fixed effects	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	320	320	320	320	320	320	320	320	320
Adjusted $R^2$	0.38	0.43	0.54	0.23	0.26	0.46	0.18	0.27	0.66

Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of monastic land reallocation, proxied by monastic income exposure in 1768, on agricultural productivity in 1852 at the *arrondissement* level. I test the sensitivity of my results presented in Table 1 excluding the 5% *arrondissements* with the top and bottom monastic income exposure. For each dependent variable, I first display the bivariate relationship in the first column, then I include my main set of controls (caloric suitability of the land, ruggedness and urban population levels in 1750) and finally I add region fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the *département* level are in parentheses and Conley (1999) standard errors, with a Bartlett kernel and a cut-off distance of 100km, in brackets. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .